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Introduction
Saudi Arabia is often treated as an exception by both political scientists
and regional specialists. This is true in many regards, but both groups
seem to have overlooked the fact that the nature of the Kingdom as an
»outlier« makes the testing and comparison of broader hypotheses in
comparative politics all the more rewarding. This is especially the case
with recent institutional changes in the political field which partially fit
patterns witnessed in many other authoritarian countries, but are at the
same time situated in a specific Saudi context of skewed state–society re-
lations and rentierism.
The Thesis
Saudi Arabia has seen a modest but discernible measure of political »lib-
eralization« since at least 2003. New spaces for debate have been opened
up, and a number of new »interest groups« have come into being, dealing
with social and political issues considered taboo just a few years before.
Elections have been held in various associations and at the municipal
level. The Kingdom seems to have departed from the old model of Saudi
politics which was characterized by an omnipresent bureaucracy and a
formally fragmented society.
This essay cannot examine in detail all areas of institutional develop-
ment in the Saudi polity. It will focus mainly on changes in economic
policy-making and the related shifts of resources and negotiation
patterns – the area which has seen the most significant changes by far
when it comes to the real influence of societal groups.1 Despite the focus
1. For a detailed discussion of the Saudi corporatist record, cf. S. Hertog, »The new
corporatism in Saudi Arabia: limits of formal politics,« in G. Luciani and A. Khalaf
(eds), Constitutional Reforms and Political Participation in the Gulf (Dubai, 2006).
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on this particular case, the analysis is part of a broader conceptual argu-
ment: I contend that the recent institutionalizations of politics in the
Kingdom signify an attempt to modernize Saudi authoritarianism and
that this is happening along »corporatist« lines. 
The inclusion of business in formal policy-making is part of this cor-
poratization, but in contrast to other groups, it is politically meaningful:
Saudi business has a tradition of formal organization and lobbying, and
has been granted space to develop historically. None of this is true of
other, recently created »civil society« organizations, which have no social
roots to draw upon. This is why the inclusion of business is a success in
terms of formal interest intermediation, whereas the activities of other
groups appear anemic and politically irrelevant.
The essay will briefly discuss »corporatism« and outline its broader
features in Saudi Arabia, followed by an analysis of corporatist structures
in economic policy-making. It will try to explain what the changes mean
for state–business relations in political terms and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, what they do not mean. In conclusion we offer some broader
theoretical and comparative remarks. 
Corporatism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
Definition
As our agenda is to bring Saudi Arabia back under consideration by
comparative politics, some conceptual remarks are inevitable. First, what
is »corporatism«? It is a specific way of organizing politics. Although it
is still not consensually defined, the corporatism debate has circled
around a number of features. For our purposes, a citation from Philippe
Schmitter’s famous 1974 essay will do.
»Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singu-
lar, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their re-
spective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.«2
2. Philippe Schmitter, »Still the Century of Corporatism?,« in: Review of Politics,
Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 1974), p. 93f.
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Among its main features, interest groups and interest articulation
mechanisms are licensed and more or less controlled by the state. They
have monopolies on specific, exclusive task areas and are therefore orga-
nized along functional lines. It is different from the ideal type of
»pluralism« which stipulates a free interplay of competing and overlap-
ping interest groups which exist independently of the state, although of
course they seek to influence it.
The original context in which the corporatism concept was spelled out
is that of South American authoritarian systems and a number of Euro-
pean pre-wwii autocracies.3 The formal organization of societal interests,
it has been argued, becomes necessary when society is more strongly mo-
bilized, state functions grow, and politics becomes more complex.
Corporatism has lost salience in the current politics of many systems or,
at any rate, in the analytical debate. I would contend, however, that the
Saudi attempts to reform (or to be seen to be reforming) its politics ap-
pear to fit this pattern surprisingly neatly.
The Saudi Corporatist Record
First, the government has attempted to organize a number of politically
sensitive professional groups in exclusive associations since 2003. This in-
cludes most saliently lawyers and journalists. Recently there has been talk
of teachers’ and writers’ associations, while students at a college in the
Western province were allowed to elect representatives for a student
council for the first time in early 2006. 
All these groups have played vocal political roles in many other Middle
East and North Africa (mena) countries, especially in those where polit-
ical parties are either weak and docile or absent.4 By acknowledging the
role of these strata, the Saudi regime has created a semblance of »mod-
ern« interest group politics, giving formal representation to different
functional segments of society. The Saudi associations, however, have
been licensed and by most standards in fact created by the state. In a strik-
3. There is also a more liberal concept of West European democratic corporatism in
which the set-up looks very similar, but has not been imposed by the state but rather
evolved organically. The standard examples are »concertations« and »high councils«
which include the government, employers, and labor.
4. A number of Saudi professional associations predate the recent initiatives, but they
tend to be in less politically sensitive areas and are indeed thoroughly apolitical.
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ingly corporatist move, even a »private« Human Rights Association has
been licensed and funded by the state and given de facto exclusive status
to lobby on human rights issues.
Secondly, the »National Dialogue,« a series of publicly acclaimed con-
ferences on social and political issues since 2003, has followed the
corporatist pattern: Although they are one-off events, they were state-
licensed and tasked with debating specific issue areas. Participants in the
different sessions were recruited along specific functional lines (clerics/in-
tellectuals, women, young people, and so on). In the absence of other
societal forums, the National Dialogue had a de facto monopoly on or-
ganized public debate at national level. Remarkably, it never claimed to
include all of society, but rather engaged it segment by segment. Con-
tinuing this pattern of sectoral compartmentalization, the issue to be
addressed by the upcoming sixth Dialogue is education – a political topic
to be sure, but a clearly delimited one.
Thirdly, one may also argue that the Majlis Ash-Shura, which has acted
as a quasi-parliament since 1993, has corporatist features: Its members are
selected by the state, according to criteria of functional representation
(with a strong presence of former bureaucrats). Its effective political role
is in fact limited to specific technocratic policy areas. It is certainly more
corporatist than most other parliaments in the world and although it is
an important and efficient institution in many regards, it would be a
stretch of the imagination to interpret it as a forum for the free interplay
of social forces.
There have been many further small attempts and trial balloons to or-
ganize society through state-licensed, functional bodies like community
centers and workers’ councils within enterprises. Alternative political in-
terest groups, which are not state-sponsored, tend to be ignored or
suppressed – the fate of an alternative human rights society in early 2004
and political petition groups. »Civil society« with its bottom-up elements
is strictly circumscribed in the Kingdom, at least when it comes to formal
organization. 
Saudi »state corporatism« is largely a top-down imposition, attempt-
ing to channel social and political interests and debates in reaction to a
series of external and internal crises. These crises include internal unrest
and issues of social disintegration in relation to the terrorist problem, as
well as external pressure from the us, international bodies, and ingos af-
ter 9/11. Some recent reform initiatives have been openly instigated by the
us, such as Saudi participation in several »Middle East Partnership Ini-
ipg 3/2006 Hertog, Saudi Arabia 69
tiative« activities, including career and professional skills workshops for
young Saudi women and cooperation on education reform. In the realm
of civil society organizations, the Saudi leadership has moreover felt the
need to be represented in bourgeoning international and regional civil
society forums of professional and human rights groups, parliamentari-
ans, and so on.
Whatever the specific impetus of reform, the absorption of the various
Saudi crises since 9/11 has to be seen against the background of an increas-
ingly complex – though formally under-organized – society which is hard
to control with merely the traditional mixture of bureaucratic and infor-
mal structures. The level of education has risen, ideological cleavages are
increasingly salient – witness the lively press debate on issues of cultural
opening – and the needs and expectations of various status groups are be-
coming more differentiated. It appears that a more formal representation
of different groups is imperative to enable interest aggregation of various
groups and to sustain social peace in the long run.
One salient feature of recent initiatives is that they give the Saudi polity
a much more formalized and modern appearance than a few years ago. A
certain traditional corporatism in which the ruling family is the arbiter for
different, broadly defined status groups – merchants, bureaucracy, for-
eign workers, tribes, and so on – arguably pre-dated recent develop-
ments.5 Nonetheless, the more clearly institutionalized corporatism,
engaging with those kinds of interest groups that supposedly emerge in
»modernization« processes, is a new phenomenon. 
Why Is It So Anemic?
Even the Saudi press has dared to criticize the often rather sterile nature
of these corporatist exercises: Interest in the National Dialogue has been
low, many journalists do not feel represented by a body mostly run by
editors-in-chief, and the lawyers’ committees reportedly do little to com-
municate with their members. Many other initiatives appear to fizzle out
after a short time. For the time being, most of the new initiatives appear
to fulfill neither their palliative function nor – as much as desired – their
5. Cf. Khaldun Naqib, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Per-
spective (London/New York: Routledge and Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1990);
Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (Lon-
don: ib Tauris 1995).
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function as sources of information and negotiation partners for the state
and as organizers of their respective societal segments.
Organizational reforms are happening above society, triggering little
discussion and have only limited outreach. This is true both of externally
imposed initiatives and of those motivated by domestic politics.
The reason for this record is the top-down nature of institutionaliza-
tion, though also – conversely – the lack of structure which characterizes
Saudi political society: The Kingdom has never undergone a period of
modern political mobilization like most other mena states.6 Attempts in
the 1950s and 1960s to create union and party structures were repressed
rather harshly, and the subsequent boom allowed the state to co-opt so-
cietal groups and make large parts of society dependent on state largesse.
Today there are few formal groups to co-opt, as even modern elites do
not have a tradition of functional organization. Saudi Arabia has few po-
litical entrepreneurs who would want and know how to organize larger
groups into formal channels. Politics is to a large extent conducted
through linkages which are local, personalized, and often paternal in
nature and not differentiated by modern criteria of stratification and
functional position in society. Even comparatively well-organized chari-
ties, which have a longer organizational tradition in the Kingdom, are
usually under the patronage of specific royals. Initiatives relating to
women in particular tend to have (otherwise underemployed) princesses
as patronesses.
As the stakes in Saudi politics and economy are rather clearly distrib-
uted, there are moreover no new strata to be mobilized for projects of
political or social transformation, as has happened in other countries
historically – at least not without unacceptable costs to established inter-
ests. For a regime, which has historically put a premium on rent-induced
quiescence and political demobilization, it is difficult to create function-
ing corporatist structures from scratch. Especially the supposedly mod-
ernizing »new middle class« is deeply fragmented and tied up in networks
of patronage, distribution, and fealty. 
6. Cf. Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century
Egypt (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989); John Waterbury, The
Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press 1983); Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State
Formation in Ba’thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant (Boulder/Oxford: Westview
1990); Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Con-
flict, 1946–1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1999).
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Although parts of society have been politicized – for example, through
dissident preachers – this has not happened in a way that is amenable to
easy co-optation into modern corporatist categories. Islamists operate
through parallel, informal ideological networks beyond state control,
which are separate from conventional interest group politics. 
Although new, functional interest groups may mature and put down
roots in their segments of society over the years, they would probably
need more autonomous leeway to do so than they have now. Interest-
ingly, Latin American corporatism has also emerged from less organized,
more localized, and clientist systems. However, the Saudi state and the
established stakes in it are much bigger than in nineteenth-century Latin
America, hence Saudi adaptability may be correspondingly lower.
Corporatism and Saudi Business
There is one case, which contradicts our findings so far: Saudi business
and its increasing formal incorporation into policy-making in recent
years. Policy consultation with the private sector has been introduced
gradually and is still partial. Nonetheless, it is much more substantive
than with any other modern interest group, and business as a lobbying
group is more coherent than any other »functional« group, which makes
the how and why of recent changes analytically interesting.
Institutions Involved
To be sure, high-ranking individual Saudi business players have long had
informal access to ministers and princes, but it is only in recent years that
consultation with business has been formalized through a number of cor-
poratist channels.
The chambers of commerce and industry are the main corporations
into which Saudi business is organized. Their history and set-up is typical
of »state corporatism«: The government supervises elections to their
boards and appoints one third of board members. Membership of cham-
bers is obligatory for all businesses. Some (limited) administrative func-
tions have been delegated to the chambers.
The chambers have in the past acted as powerful veto players. Now-
adays, however, they tend to get more involved in the details of policy
negotiation. On the one hand, they are going through a gradual process
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of internal maturation. There is a slow generational change in which new
leaders emerge, sometimes from the upper middle stratum of business (as
opposed to the very big patriarchs of yore). Although their policy re-
search capacity is still quite limited, they are commissioning more
reports, organizing more symposia, and proposing more laws than they
did in the past. On the other hand, the state allows a greater role for them
through regular circulation of draft laws and other regulations, which are
usually discussed in the chambers’ sectoral committees. This happened
on an ad hoc basis for several years, but now includes virtually all new
economic regulations. The administration is still careful not to lose con-
trol and divulge too much information, but a substantial change in the
procedure of economic policy-making has been discernible.
One major player in the new set-up is the Supreme Economic Council
(sec), which then Crown Prince (now King) Abdallah created in 1999.
The sec effectively is a mini-cabinet comprising the most important min-
isters dealing with economic questions. It is part of Abdallah’s careful
economic reform drive and has an advisory panel (Majlis Ash-Shura) at-
tached which also includes select private sector figures. Chamber and
other business representatives are invited for hearings on specific issues.
Although the set-up is rather statist, it is reminiscent of »concertations«
and »high councils« in (liberal) European corporatism (minus labor rep-
resentation, that is). The extent of formal consultation and input through
presentations and studies from private consultants and business groups
is unprecedented.
The Majlis Ash-Shura itself has included a limited number of business-
men, some of whom, like Abdalrahman Al-Zamil, are very vocal on
economic issues. Economic policy is one of the areas in which the Majlis
is relatively important, and it too invites private sector representatives for
hearings, usually in specialized committees.
The Saudi private sector has also been granted representation on func-
tionally specialized bodies, like the board of the General Investment
Authority. Altogether Saudi business, often led by the chambers, has be-
come integrated into a much more formalized pattern of policy-making,
in which draft laws pass between the full cabinet, the sec, and the Majlis
Ash-Shura, often offering several access points for consultation. This is in
stark contrast to the fully bureaucratized pattern of economic policy-
making in the 1980s. Then, laws would emerge from backdoor discus-
sions with a few consultants in a relevant ministry, drawing on informal
consultation with a few trusted business magnates at best, to be quickly
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pushed through the cabinet subsequently (and sometimes rescinded as
they proved impracticable).
Some Examples of Corporatist Negotiation
There are a number of important regulations which illustrate the change
in policy-making patterns. The 2003 income tax law, for example, had
been debated in the Majlis for two years and room was made for thor-
ough consultations before ratification. It was eventually brought down
due to business lobbying. A similar law in the late 1980s, by contrast, was
announced from one day to another, only to be rescinded a few days later
due to massive protests after its introduction, among others by expatri-
ates who walked out from their workplaces. Although the policy out-
come in both cases was similar, in 2003 it was a result of consultation,
whereas 15 years earlier it came only after the government realized the law
was unimplementable.
The new foreign investment regulations of 2000 are another example
of extensive consultation, when several items demanded by private sector
representatives were taken on board (for example, regarding tax issues
and minimum investment levels). The Riyadh chamber was also instru-
mental in convincing the government to provide gas to the capital for
industrial use, and the chambers have proposed drafts on trademark and
anti-dumping issues. They have taken part in substantive negotiations on
the labor law and the pending company law.7
Saudi economic corporatism grants the relatively mature Saudi busi-
ness sector representation in a number of tightly compartmentalized,
specific institutions. This is not to say that the private sector is always
united or well-informed or has high-quality input to offer – the opposite
is often the case. However, it is a serious actor, especially through the
chambers, and is increasingly included in policy deliberations. With its
partial opening, the regime is slowly reacting to a shift in resources in the
balance of state and bureaucracy, in which the state wants more from the
private sector, but can deliver less – in managerial and administrative
terms, as well as in terms of capital and, often, information.
7. Concerning the labor law, a state–business consensus had been reached after long
discussions, only to be destroyed by a new draft emerging from the bureaucracy.
The government still has the last word, and the policy-making process, though
more regularized, can still be interrupted by haphazard interventions.
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State and Business: Mutual Needs and Capacities
What makes business special? The main factor, arguably, is that it has en-
joyed much more space for historical development than any other social
stratum, as it has traditionally been an ally of the regime. The Saudi pri-
vate sector has possibly reached the highest stage of economic maturity
in all of the Middle East. Although it is a class largely created by the state,
through years of massive rent accumulation, it has developed its own dy-
namics and capacities.8 It is internationally integrated, and a sizeable
number of business leaders are highly educated. Although Saudi business
players are still tied up in cronyist networks, their policy demands have
become more complex as their managerial and production structures are
much more advanced than 20 or 30 years ago. 
Large-scale private sector projects require predictability and solid legal
and infrastructural services. Industrial producers and service providers re-
quire consistent standards of some kind, and although they can often
leverage their connections, many of them are increasingly fed up with
day-to-day bureaucratic obstructionism and intransparency which cause
deadweight losses proportionate to the complexity of the economy and
of business operations. Such slow changes in perception are reinforced by
the generational shift the private sector is currently witnessing, as old
family patriarchs die and businesses enter a phase of transition, which in
the more successful cases often results in the transformation of family as-
sets into public companies.
The state, at the same time, has reached the limits of its distributional
capacities, as it can no longer provide guaranteed employment and public
services are creaking. The efficiency of the fragmented bureaucracy is
rather low and the leadership is increasingly realizing that it will require
the private sector for employment and growth generation. It is forced to
offer serious investment opportunities because Saudi capital has an im-
plicit or explicit exit option, as shown by the Saudi presence not only on
international financial markets, but increasingly also in investment
projects in other Middle East countries.
The state therefore needs the business sector and, although it retains
the last say on economic regulation, has increasingly been willing to listen
8. Cf. Giacomo Luciani, »Saudi Arabian Business: From Private Sector to National
Bourgeoisie,« in: Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (eds), Saudi Arabia in the Bal-
ance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (London: Hurst 2005), pp. 144–181.
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to this sector’s views. What is important in our context is that Saudi busi-
ness has been able to aggregate its interests in a more coherent fashion
than other modern groups in the Kingdom.9 The new focus of the regime
on consultation and participation could draw on established organiza-
tional networks.
Business has traditionally been given more scope for organizing itself
and debating policy than most other potential interest groups in Saudi
society, and the uneven record of the corporatist initiatives reflects this.
Whereas for intellectuals, lawyers, journalists, and so on, the instant cor-
poratism appears stale and to have limited outreach, business has been
allowed to establish itself structurally and organizationally.
What Does It Mean?
The fact that the private sector is being given specific formal access means
that its partnership with the regime is being modernized. This does not
mean that the ground for broader political participation is being
prepared – the new procedures outlined above are rather a corporatist al-
ternative to an openly political role for the private sector. The fledgling
bourgeoisie may have brought democracy to some countries in European
history; it is unlikely to do so in modern Saudi Arabia. As long as big
Saudi business is furnished with specific channels of access and opportu-
nity, they have no need for grand politics. 
The Kingdom follows a global logic: In other Middle Eastern cases
and in Latin America, businesses have been »contingent democrats« at
best. Democracy has occasionally been used as a means of protecting spe-
cific private interests, but these could also be protected through selective
political access in authoritarian systems.10 Even in nineteenth-century
Europe, from which we derive our paradigm of the liberalizing bourgeoi-
9. I am referring to larger business players who tend to dominate the chambers and
policy debates in general. The numerous smes in the Kingdom are under-organized
and have little political voice. In contrast to other Islamic countries, a middle-rank-
ing »Islamic bourgeoisie« (as Gilles Kepel has described it in: Jihad: The Trail of Po-
litical Islam, London: ib Tauris 2002) has not emerged. One of the reasons – beyond
generally low opportunities and interest in mobilization – is that a large share of
smaller enterprises are run and often informally owned by expatriates.
10. Eva Bellin, Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored De-
velopment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2002).
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sie, business tended to be uninterested in mass democracy, as their early
role was often limited to fighting for the political participation of bour-
geois elites.11 
In the current Saudi setting, the selective access, which the regime
grants, seems preferable to any conceivable political alternative. With a
few individual exceptions, the Saudi private sector is indeed remarkably
apolitical and interested at most in certain issues of inefficiency, corrup-
tion, and fiscal accountability. The example of corporatist inclusion of
business also demonstrates that formal interest politics can coexist with
traditional forms of clientism, as large business actors use both formal
and informal channels to further their interests.
Some Comparative Remarks
Saudi Arabia has embarked upon a process of partial authoritarian mod-
ernization. The regime appears to be reengineering its ruling coalition,
with somewhat more – although clearly circumscribed – space for the pri-
vate sector, and a number of less successful attempts to organize other
societal groups into institutionalized »corporations.« The regime has
tried to channel social interests, offer tokens of participation, and, possi-
bly, pre-empt the emergence of independent organizations. 
In the Saudi case we may be witnessing a specific type of »rentier cor-
poratism,« which combines top-down attempts to formalize interest
representation with a patronage-dependent society that is not amenable
to being formally organized. Several authors in the rentier state debate
have argued that resource-rich regimes can use their powers of patronage
to undermine autonomous groups in society, especially when oil is avail-
able at an early phase of state-led development. Distribution and co-
optation are used to demobilize civil society, dismantle independent or-
ganizations, and increase dependency on the state.12 This is what seems
to have happened in Saudi history, with only specific strata – namely busi-
ness and religious interests – allowed to coalesce as interest groups. If a
11. Ann Bernstein and Peter L. Bergen (eds.), Business and Democracy: Cohabitation or
Contradiction? (London/New York: Continuum 1998).
12. Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building (London: ib Tau-
ris 1998); Michael Ross, »Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,« in: World Politics, Vol. 53
() (April 2001), pp. 325–361.
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regime then tries to formally organize societal interests later on when
challenged to modernize its rule, it tends to meet indifference within an
informally structured society, and the new organizations remain socially
and politically irrelevant. 
How specific is this to Saudi Arabia? Rentier states are always situated
in specific histories; oil seldom determines regime choices or creates a
»tabula rasa« of political institutions. The Saudi story, therefore, cannot
be easily generalized. It is all the more instructive to investigate in which
cases a »rentier corporatist« trajectory might develop and in which cases
it does not.
Following the »method of difference,« other oil monarchies in the
Gulf are obvious objects of comparison. Variation in terms of the private
sector’s political role is particularly interesting. In Kuwait, by contrast to
Saudi Arabia, there is a historical tradition of parliamentary representa-
tion of business, which tends be more politicized in times of crisis. The
business class is less of a creation of the state and has strong pre-oil polit-
ical traditions, which apparently makes it harder to fence in, which
indicates the crucial importance of the historical timing of oil income.
The same point is borne out in quite a different way in Oman where, at
least until recently, major business families have been so deeply
ensconced within the administration that a formalization of politics –
whether democratic or authoritarian corporatist – may appear less press-
ing. Large business families managed to install themselves in the state
apparatus at an early stage of state formation, in several cases developing
long-term claims on specific ministries. 
Saudi state–business relations may be more comparable to those in
Bahrain: There, the private sector is close to the old autocracy, but not as
deeply involved in the administration as in Oman, and it has recently
been encouraged by the – highly authoritarian – prime minister to engage
in the officially sanctioned political institutions. Balancing more autono-
mous and radical social groups appears to be one of several motivations
for this.
At the same time, Bahrain in general has witnessed a flourishing of civil
society groups in recent years, which reflects the much higher level of po-
litical mobilization of Bahraini society, which is a function of stronger
social cleavages and, crucially, historical precedents of political liberalism.
Bahrain has also seen some attempts at tripartite negotiations between
the state, employers, and unions, which would be inconceivable in the
Kingdom, where unions are outlawed. 
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Both Bahrain and Kuwait have experienced longer periods of political
contestation and mobilization in their modern histories, and their land-
scape of interest groups, though partially organized along corporatist
lines, appears much livelier. In this sense, they are also less close to the
ideal type »rentier state.« Saudi Arabia seems closer to the United Arab
Emirates and Qatar: Both are systems with little associational tradition,
lacking a history of political mobilization in recent decades. Massive oil
riches have made a dominant patronage role for the state and its elites
possible. Like the Saudi kingdom, both have recently tried to create »civil
society« organizations such as professional associations and unions – ex-
periments which have proved quite feeble and have aroused little public
interest. If anything, they seem to be even closer to the ideal type of »rent-
ier corporatism« than Saudi Arabia.13 In none of them, however, do social
and cultural tensions appear to be as pressing as in Saudi Arabia.
Beyond the Gulf, Saudi corporatism may indicate a certain conver-
gence of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems in general, including re-
publican ones where authoritarian corporatism has a longer history. Of
course »progressive« republics like Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria also have a
much stronger mobilizational tradition with powerful, if state-controlled,
organizations representing different socio-economic strata. The recent
evisceration of the more populist elements of their corporatism – namely
workers’ and peasants’ unions – and their more austere and pro-business
orientation may indicate that in certain regards the cases are meeting in
the middle.14 We might be seeing a convergence on a model with two
main features: First, the systems are characterized by more formalized elite
politics and a greater balance of forces between regime and business, sim-
ilar perhaps to the early liberalism of nineteenth-century Europe. Concur-
rently, however, other state-licensed interest groups and institutions of
broader participation are often empty shells, and large parts of society are
uninterested in day-to-day politics, at least as long as there is no broader
crisis. Regimes with very different origins are looking increasingly similar.
13. In Qatar and the uae, the private sector also still seems to be so clearly in the shadow
of the government that it has not become a major political player.
14. On the changing nature of corporatism in the republican regimes of the Middle
East, cf. Anoush Ehteshami and Emma Murphy, »Transformation of the Corporat-
ist State in the Middle East,« in: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17 (4) (December
1996), pp. 753–772. 
